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We study the properties of a GEI model with nominal assets, outside money (injected
into the economy as in Magill and Quinzii [17]), and multiple currencies. We analyze
the existence of monetary equilibria and the structure of the equilibrium set under two
di¤erent assumptions on the determination of the exchange rates. If currencies are perfect
substitutes, equilibrium allocations are indeterminate and, generically, sunspot equilibria
exist. Generically, given a nonsunspot equilibrium, there are Pareto improving (and Pareto
worsening) sunspot equilibria associated with an increase in the volatility of the future
exchange rates. We interpret this property as showing that, in general, there is no clear-
cut e¤ect on welfare of the excess volatility of exchange rates, even when due to purely
extrinsic phenomena.
Key Words: Incomplete markets, exchange rates, real indeterminacy, sunspots,
Pareto e¢ ciency
JEL Classication: D52
1. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the determinants of exchange rates is still largely an open is-
sue. Since Meese and Rogo¤ [21], it is well known that standard theoretical models
perform very poorly in predicting the short-run behavior of exchange rates (see
also Cheung, Chinn and Pascual [7]). Moreover, it is often claimed that exchange
rates exhibit excess volatility, and that this may entail a welfare cost. Starting with
Kareken and Wallace [15], several theoretical contributions have studied economies
where exchange rates may be indeterminate and may be a¤ected by extrinsic uncer-
tainty. Their seminal paper considers a two-country overlapping generation envi-
ronment with no uncertainty and where the two currencies are perfect substitutes.
They show that equilibrium exchange rates are indeterminate. Their key result sur-
vives in cash-in-advance environments with innitely living agents and where cur-
rencies play a pure transactional role, see King, Wallace and Weber [16]. Manuelli
1This is a completely revised and extended version of a paper by the rst author, "Real indeter-
minacy and nominal exchange rates", part of his Ph.D. dissertation at the Universitè Catholique
de Louvain. He wishes to thank for suggestions and encouragements H. Polemarchakis. Careful
suggestions by a referee of this journal have been particularly helpful. The usual disclaimers apply.
The second author aknowledges the nancial support of MIUR - PRIN 2009. The views expressed
here are those of the authors and do not involve the EU Commission.
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and Peck [18] consider a stochastic OLG model, and do not restrict the analysis
to stationary equilibria. They show that stationary allocations can be associated
to nonconstant exchange rate processes, so that it is impossible to derive general
conclusions on the e¢ ciency of equilibria looking at the volatility of exchange rates.
Bear in mind that excess volatility is essentially innocuous in terms of welfare, in
the two classes of economies just mentioned. An additional contribution along these
lines is Russel [28]. He extends the analysis allowing for the existence of two real
assets in an economy where price levels are inversely correlated (hence, returns on
money holdings positively correlated) with the returns from the real assets of the
same country. In this context, the author shows existence and Pareto-inferiority
of quasi-sunspot equilibria. Finally, Alonso [1] considers a Shubik trading-posts
model with uncertainty, and shows that equilibrium exchange rates are indetermi-
nate and a¤ect welfare when currencies are perfect substitutes. The relevance of
perfect substitutability is conrmed by the literature on search models of money,
which analyzes the conditions for the coexistence of several currencies and the en-
dogenous choice of currencies in a multi-country environment. In particular, Martin
[19] shows that, in a two-country, cash-in-advance model with xed costs for the use
of foreign currencies, the exchange rate is determinate if there are enough frictions
to endogenously prevent all the agents from trading in more than one currency -
i.e. if xed costs are high enough.
Our starting point is a version of Magill and Quinzii [17], simplied by assuming
that outside money has a pure transactional role.2 A previous application of their
approach to study open economies is in Neumeyer [22]. He considers a two-period,
two-country economy where each country currency is injected by forcing each agent
to sell her endowment of commodities to the central exchange of her home country.
Agents can then use the currency to buy from the central exchange of each country.
We basically consider the same class of economies, extending the analysis to
an arbitrary number of commodities (in Neumeyer [22] there is just one good in
each country). We mainly study the opposite polar case, where each agent can
choose the central exchange where to sell her endowment. This corresponds to
the frictionless case of the literature. If, at least some, agents can choose the
exchange they sell their endowment to, the price levels in the two countries are not
determined anymore by their country-specic quantity of money equation, because
the two equations collapse into just one set of restrictions. This reopens the door
to the possibility of obtaining real indeterminacy of the equilibrium set. More
precisely, under this formulation of the model, monetary equilibria exhibit as many
degrees of real indeterminacy as the number of tomorrow states of nature.3 We
restrict the analysis to two-period, two-country economies. Obviously, this has no
bearing on our results. They hold as long as the number of states of nature is nite
and asset markets are incomplete.
The logic behind the di¤erent properties of the equilibria associated with the
two specications of the monetary equations is transparent. Assuming perfectly
free trade, absence of arbitrage opportunities in commodity trading imposes that
the law of one price holds, so that commodity prices must be identical, once mea-
sured in the same currency. When, as in Neumeyer [22], there are two distinct
2For the closed economy, they show that the absence of a role of money as store of value has
no substantive e¤ects on the properties of the equilibria, so that, without any loss of generality,
we can ignore this function, as long as the risk-free asset is in the asset span.
3Polemarchakis [27] studies real indeterminacy in GEI economies with exchange rates, but
without outside money.
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monetary equations for each state of nature, the money supply in each country
determines the (domestic) absolute price level. Then, the PPP condition xes the
exchange rates. This leaves no "free" endogenous parameters and, generically, leads
to local uniqueness of equilibria. To the contrary, if the total money supply (con-
verted into a common currency) determines just the world price level (in the same
currency), the monetary conditions are satised by di¤erent combinations of price
levels and exchange rates. Once we x the period 0 numeraire and exchange rate,
the remaining degrees of nominal indeterminacy generically translate into the same
number of degrees of real indeterminacy. As usual in this class of economies, the
two models have, in a precise sense, the same set of equilibrium allocations. With
indeterminacy they are parameterized by exchange rates, which can be arbitrarily
xed. In the determined case, by the vectors of money supply. Therefore, apart
from the interest of the indeterminate case per se, it is also convenient to study
it because the results have a natural re-interpretation in terms of the determinate
case, which is more tricky due to purely technical problems, since the rank of the
matrix describing assetspayo¤s is not invariant over the set of possible exchange
rate vectors.
An additional motivation for the interest in the indeterminate case is that,
as common in the GEI literature, real indeterminacy of equilibria allows for the
generic existence of sunspot equilibria. The possible relevance of extrinsic vari-
ables in the determination of exchange rates has been previously discussed in the
literature; among others, in some of the papers mentioned above. The persistence
of excess volatility in exchange rates is well-established in the empirical literature.
The prevailing view is that it is unambiguously bad, welfare-wise.4 When equilib-
ria are indeterminate and sunspot equilibria exist, the appropriate notion of excess
volatility is not completely obvious.5 Here, we simply mean any (mean-preserving)
increase in the variance of the exchange rates across equilibria. Technically, we
compare a generic nonsunspot equilibrium with sunspot equilibria characterized
by a (mean-preserving) increase in the variance of the exchange rates. Section 4
shows that, given an equilibrium where sunspots do not matter, generically there
are Pareto improving sunspot equilibria characterized by excess volatility of the ex-
change rates. Not surprisingly, there are also Pareto worsening sunspot equilibria
with the same characteristics in terms of volatility. Hence, in general, it is impos-
sible to provide any theoretically sound statement on the welfare impact of excess
volatility. The same basic argument also applies, modulo some technicalities, to
mean-preserving spreads of the exchange rates across pure extrinsic events.
The paper is structured as follows: we present the model in Section 2. Section
3 analyzes existence and real indeterminacy of monetary equilibria in the economy
with and without extrinsic uncertainty. In particular, we establish that equilibria
typically exhibit as many degrees of real indeterminacy as states of nature in the
second period, independently of their nature. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis
of the welfare e¤ects of mean-preserving increases in the variance of exchange rates.
We focus the analysis on sunspot equilibria, because, technically, this is the most
demanding case and because sunspot volatility is a particularly strong denition of
4Explicit analyses of the welfare cost of exchange rates volatility usually conclude that they
are fairly small, see, for instance, Bacchetta, and Van Wincoop [2], Devereux, and Engel [10], and
Bergin, Shin, Templeton, and Tchakarov [9]. However, their denition is not in terms of purely
extrinsic excess volatility.
5For instance, Citanna and Schmedders [9] dene excess volatility of equilibrium asset prices
as variance over and above the one associated with the complete market equilibrium.
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excess volatility. The same results hold in the economy without sunspots, where
we can exploit full rank perturbations of the parameters of the economy. The main
di¤erence concerns the restriction on the maximum number of agents for which
the results hold. The nal section briey considers the case of economies with two
distinct monetary equations, i.e., the direct generalization of Neumeyer [22].
Several denitions and statements are formulated with direct reference to the
sunspot economy. Their counterparts for the economy with no extrinsic uncertainty
are always obvious.
2. THE ECONOMY
The basic structure is standard. There are two time periods with S intrinsic
states of nature tomorrow, indexed by s = 1; :::S; s = 0 denotes the rst period. At
each s, there are L identical physical commodities, indexed by ` = 1; :::; L: There
are H agents, partitioned into two sets Hc; #Hc  1; where c 2 fA;Bg denotes
one of the two countries.
With each intrinsic state s; we associate K extrinsic events, indexed by k =
1; :::;K: Thus, a state of nature is ks  ; ks = 11;..., KS  ; and L = ( + 1)L
is the total number of commodities. For notational convenience, and without any
loss of generality, the extrinsic variables realize before the intrinsic one and are
equiprobable.
With respect to consumers, we assume:
A1: For each h, uh : R
(S+1)L
++ ! R is a C2; Von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ity function withrxhuh >> 0; and vTD2xhuhv < 0 for each v 6= 0: For each xh >> 0;
cl
n
xh 2 RL(S+1)++ juh (xh)  uh (xh)
o
 RL(S+1)++ : Moreover, !h 2 RL(S+1)++ : In the
sunspot economy, !h 2 RL++ and !ksh = !k
0s
h ; for each s and each pair k; k
0:
The vector e   e0; :::; e 2 R+1++ describes the exchange rates, i.e., the num-
bers of units of the currency of country B required to buy one unit of currency A
at the di¤erent spots.
The sunspot-invariant vector of asset i0 s payo¤s in terms of home currency is
ri =

ri1; :::; riS

. Given e; the matrix of asset payo¤s in terms of currency B is
R (e) =
264 e
1r11    e1rIA1 r(IA+1)1    rI1
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
er1S    erIAS r(IA+1)S    rIS
375 :
rks (e)  eksr1s; :::; rIs  [eksrsA; rsB ] is the vector of asset payo¤s in spot  = ks:
The matrices RA(e) and RB denote the payo¤s (in terms of currency B) of the two
subsets of assets. In the sequel, with some abuse of notation, we will occasionally use
R (e) to refer to the payo¤ matrix in the economy without sunspots. No confusion
should arise. We will always maintain:
A2: i: I < S;
ii: rank RA(1) = IA and rank RB = IB ; with I  IA + IB ; and
the two submatrices of RA(1) and RB associated with event k = 1 are in general
position.
The general position assumption guarantees that, generically in e; R(e) has full
rank I (see Lemma 1 below). For each asset i; the price (in national currency) is
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qi: Absence of arbitrage opportunities requires that there is  2 R++ such that
e0q1; :::; e0qIA ; qIA+1; :::; qI

= []
T
R (e) :
Let
Y (e) 
  e0q1; :::; e0qIA ; :::; qI
R (e)


  e0qA
RA (e)
   qB
RB

:
Assuming that there are no frictions in commodity trade, the law of one price holds.
Therefore, if pc is state  vector of commodity prices in country c; denoted in terms
of its currency; it must be epA = p

B ; for each : Hence, we can drop from the
notation pB and set p
 = pA: Let 	(p; e) be the ( + 1)  L-dimensional matrix
of commodity prices in terms of country B currency,
	(p; e) =
264 e
0p0    0
...
. . .
...
0    ep
375 :
Finally, (MA;MB) 2 R2(S+1)++ is the pair of (exogenous) vectors of money supply in
the two countries: They are sunspot-invariant.
In the sequel, we will often treat asymmetrically some variables:We will use the
superscript "n0" to indicate that we are ignoring the spot 0 variables. Thus, for
instance, 	n0(p; e) is given by the last  rows of 	(p; e): Similarly, pnL denotes the
price system, once we eliminate pL; for each :
2.1. Exchange rate regimes
The monetary equations implicitly dening the exchange rate regime are ob-
tained by an extension to a two-country model of the set-up proposed by Magill
and Quinzii [17]. In a one-country economy, agents sell their initial endowments to
a central exchange to acquire outside money issued by the exchange itself. In turn,
they use the money so obtained to buy commodities. Moving to a two-country
set-up, we have two polar cases.
In the rst (the one considered in Neumeyer [22]), agents must sell their ini-
tial endowment to their home country central exchange and can buy from either
one of them. This implies
PHc
h=1 p
ks
c !
s
h = M
s
c ; for each c. Absence of commod-
ity arbitrage imposes the additional restriction epA = p

B : While there are some
technical problems for the proof of the existence of monetary equilibria, it is fairly
intuitive that equilibria, and, hence, exchange rates, are determinate. There are
several alternative precise specications of the mechanism of trading with the two
central exchanges leading to the same main result: as long as there are two separate
monetary eqs., equilibria are determinate.
We describe this class of economies with the monetary equations
Gd(MA;MB ; p; e) 

ekspksHh !
s
h   eksMsA  MsB ; for each k and s
pksHAh !
s
h  MsA; for each k and s

= 0:
The opposite polar case is the one of indeterminacy. Essentially as in Kareken
and Wallace [15], real indeterminacy holds when the two currencies are perfect
substitutes, i.e., in our set-up, when agents can freely buy and sell from each central
exchange. Given prices and exchange rates, for each agent the choice of the quantity
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of his endowment to be sold to each central exchange is indeterminate, at each
equilibrium. Therefore, the only actual restrictions are the law of one price for the
commodities and ekspks
PH
h=1 !
s
A = e
ksMsA +M
s
B : We will show that, given any
vector e; we can always nd a price normalization such that a monetary equilibrium
exists and that, generically, nominal indeterminacy translates into  degrees of real
indeterminacy. For this case, it is convenient to write the monetary eqs. as
Gnd(MA;MB ; p; e; E) 

ekspksHh !
s
h   eksMsA  MsB ; for each k and s
eks   Eks; for each k and s

= 0;
for some arbitrary, exogenously given E 2 R+1++ :
Clearly, Gnd : R
L+2(S+1)+2(+1)
++ ! R2(+1)++ ; while Gd : RL
+2(S+1)+(+1)
++ !
R2(+1)++ :
It is worthwhile to stress that, generically, real indeterminacy requires perfect
substitutability among currencies. For instance, equilibria of economies with di¤er-
ent transaction costs for resident and non-resident trading with a central exchange
are typically determined (see also, in a di¤erent set-up, Martin [19]). Still, the case
of perfect substitutability is interesting for the reasons discussed in the introduction:
2.2. Consumers behavior
Given   (p; q; e), each agent chooses her optimal consumption bundle and
portfolio (xh; yh) solving optimization problem
choose (xh; yh) 2 argmax
X
>0
uh
 
x0h; x

h

K
subject to 	()zh = Y ()yh; (1)
where zh  (xh   !h) ; i.e., under A1 (and omitting the irrelevant term 1K ), she
chooses h  (xh; yh; h) such that
FOCh(h; ) 
24 Dxh P>0 uh  x0h; xh 	()T [h]Y ()T [h]
 	() zh + Y ()yh
35 = 0;
where h 2 R+1++ is the vector of Lagrange multipliers.
2.3. Equilibrium
An equilibrium is dened by the usual conditions, market clearing and individual
optimization, and by one of the two sets of monetary equations.
Definition 1. Given (MA;MB); a monetary equilibrium (ME) is a vector  
(p; q; e) with associated (x; y) such that
a: for each h, (xh; yh) is an optimal solution to (1), given ,
b:
P
h zh = 0;
c:
P
h yh = 0;
d: Gnd(MA;MB ; p; e; E) = 0; for some E 2 R+1++ (respectively, Gd(MA;MB ; p; e) =
0).
Given a ME allocation x, sunspots do not matter if and only if, for each h and
s; xksh = x
k0s
h ; for each k and k.
In the sequel, we will always clarify the equilibrium we are considering by making
reference to the relevant set of monetary equations.
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Remark 1. Equilibria where sunspots do non matter are induced in the natural
way by the equilibria of the economy with no sunspots at all. Indeed, if  2
RL(S+1)++  RI  RS+1++ is a ME in the economy without sunspots, b 2 RL(+1)++ 
RI  R+1++ ; with (bp0; bq)   p0; q and (bpks; beks)  (ps; es) ; for each k and s; is a
ME of the sunspot economy where, evidently, sunspots do not matter.
Remark 2. If  is an equilibrium with associated (
_
x;
_
y); then, for each be0 > 0;
there is a ME b with be = (be0; _e1; ::; _e) with associated the same allocation (_x; _y):
Simply set bp  p for each  6= 0; bp0   e0be0 p0; bqB  qB ; and bqA   e0be0 qA;
where  > 0 is such that be0M0A +M0B = e0p0Ph !0h: Hence, at least one degree
of indeterminacy is purely nominal. In the sequel, we will mostly set e0 = p0L = 1,
identify e with
 
e11; :::; e

; p with
 
p0nL; :::; p

, and drop the spot 0 monetary
eqs., because they are always satised, modulo a renormalization.
2.4. The space of the economies
Most of our results hold for a generic subset of economies and, at the di¤erent
stages of the analysis, we will make reference just to the set of parameters that
we will need to perturb. We start dening the space of the economies in its most
general form as
  ((:::; (uh; !h) ; :::) ; r; (Mn0A ;Mn0B )) 2
Y
h
(U  RL(S+1)++ )< R2S++  ;
where U is the space of functions satisfying A1 above, < is the set of (sunspot-
invariant) asset payo¤s such that A2 holds. Given that we are ignoring the period
0 monetary equations, (Mn0A ;M
n0
B ) 2 R2S++.
Euclidean spaces are endowed with the standard topology, U with the C2
compact-open topology and  with the product topology.
To parameterize utility functions, we adopt a locally quadratic perturbation of
uh: Consider any sunspot-invariant vector  and let h be the (sunspot-invariant)
agent h0s optimal choice. Pick any open ball V"(xh)  RL(S+1)++ such that V2"(xh) 
RL(S+1)++ ; and any smooth bump function  (xh) ; such that  (xh) = 1 if xh 2
V"(xh);  (xh) = 0 if xh =2 clV2"(xh): Replace uh (xh) with
euh (xh) = uh (xh) +  (xh)axh   1
2
[xh]
T
D [xh]

;
where a 2 RL(S+1); while D is a (L(S + 1) L(S + 1)) symmetric matrix. Evi-
dently, given  (xh) ; for jjajj and jjDjj small enough, euh (xh) satises A1.
In the sequel, a subset of  is generic if it is open and dense. When utility
functions are xed, we strengthen the notion, requiring that the subset has full
Lebesgue measure, too.
We consider both the economy without sunspots and the one with sunspots. In
the analysis, all the fundamental parameters are obviously sunspot-invariant.
3. ECONOMIES WITH GND(:) = 0
3.1. Equilibria in the economy without extrinsic uncertainty
If we impose Gnd(:) = 0, a ME always exists. It su¢ ces to x e = E 2 RS+1++ ,
and to impose a normalization esMsA +M
s
B = e
sps
PH
h=1 !
s
h; for each s > 0; and
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 
p0; q
 2 : Then, we can exploit the xed point argument of Werner [31], for
instance. Modulo a renormalization of
 
p0; q

(so that the monetary equations
hold at s = 0; too); this allows us to show the existence of a ME (see Thm. 1).
Moreover, under A2, and for a generic (see Lemma 1 below) choice of the vector E;
rank R(E) = I: For economies in this set, generic regularity of equilibria follows
by a standard argument. Hence, we simply summarize these properties.
First, it is fairly intuitive that, under A2, generically rankR(E) = I: For com-
pleteness, we formally establish this property in the next Lemma. The proof is in
Appendix.
Lemma 1. Under A2, there is an open, dense subset of RS++; of full Lebesgue
measure, E ; such that, for each E 2 E ; rankR(E) = I; in the economy without
sunspots:
Using Lemma 1, the next Thm. summarizes existence and regularity properties
of ME. Its proof follows by a standard argument, that we omit.
Theorem 1. Under the maintained assumptions, in the economy associated
with Gnd(:) = 0, there is a ME. At each E 2 E ; and for each  2 0
 
E

; an open,
dense subset of ; ME are locally described by a nite collection of smooth functionsn
(j (; E) ; j1 (; E) ; :::; 
j
H(; E)
o
; for j = 1; :::; J .
To analyze real indeterminacy of equilibria, we use the denition proposed in
Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell [14]: The set of equilibrium allocations has S degrees
of real indeterminacy if it contains the image of a nonempty, open subset of RS
under a smooth, injective map. The basic logic of our argument is the same as
in [14, Thm. 2]: di¤erent vectors (e; be) typically induce di¤erent spans of the
payo¤ matrix in terms of real purchasing power. Generically, this translates into
indeterminacy of the equilibrium allocation. Here, changes of the vector e act on
the span of the matrix R(e) through two channels: their direct e¤ect on < R(e) > 6
and their e¤ect on commodity prices, due to the monetary eqs. Hence, their proof
needs to be adjusted to keep into account this last feature of our model. The details
are in Appendix.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of Thm. 1, in the economy associated
with Gnd(:) = 0, if H > I and S > 2I; there is an open, dense set of economies

 
E
  0  E such that the set of equilibrium allocations has S degrees of real
indeterminacy.
Remark 3. Most of the results on GEI with variable asset prices show that there
are (S   1) degrees of real indeterminacy. Here, the "free" parameter E a¤ects the
span of the return matrix acting di¤erently on the payo¤s of the assets of the two
countries. This explains why we have one more degree of real indeterminacy than
usual. A similar result holds for economies with mixed (partly real, partly nominal)
payo¤s (see Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell [14, Thm. 2] and Pietra [23]). Also, we
require that the number of degrees of incompleteness is su¢ ciently large (S > 2I):
This is a standard assumption for economies with both real and nominal assets
(see, again, Thm. 2 in [14] and [23]). It is quite likely that this last restriction
could be relaxed at some cost in terms of technicalities.
6Our set-up is closer to the one of their Thm. 2, where they consider economies with both real
and nominal assets.
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Remark 4. Regularity of ME only requires endowment perturbations, so that
it holds for a generic subset of endowments of full Lebesgue measure. To the
contrary, our proof of real indeterminacy also exploits utility perturbations, so that
the generic set 
 
E

is an open and dense subset of :
Remark 5. The vector E plays a double role. In Thm. 1, we x it and determine
the set of regular economies 0
 
E

; which depends upon E: In Thm. 2, given
 2   E ; we consider the set of equilibria (locally) associated with the economies
described (among the other parameters) by E itself.
Remark 6. Dealing with a two-country economy, it is common to assume that
there is a risk-free (in terms of home currency) asset in each country. This is a
typical assumption made in most open macroeconomic models. With the monetary
equations Gnd(:) = 0; ME exist for each asset structure such that A2 holds. In
Lemma 1, we just require that RA(1) and RB are in general position (not that
[RA(1) RB ] is). Hence, the result holds if we require the existence of a risk-free
asset in each country. The proofs of Thm. 1 and 2 do not require perturbations
of the payo¤s of assets 1 and IA + 1 either, so that they hold if we impose this
additional restriction. This also implies that there is no loss of generality in our
ignoring the role of outside money as a store of value.
3.2. Sunspot equilibria
Here, we consider the existence of sunspot equilibria. This can also be seen
as preliminary work for the following section. We study economies in the generic
(as we will show in Lemma 2) set (E) for which nonsunspot ME are regular
in the sunspot extension of the economy, and study the real e¤ects of changes in
the vector E: Our argument is purely local. Consider an economy  2 (E) with
a regular equilibrium (in the economy without sunspots) such that R(E) has full
rank and ME display S degrees of real indeterminacy. This ME naturally induces
a nonsunspot equilibrium. We show that, modulo a sunspot-invariant perturbation
of (u1; !1) ; this nonsunspot equilibrium is regular in the sunspot economy and that
sunspot ME display  degrees of real indeterminacy, so that sunspots matter.
Compared with previous results in sunspot economies with nominal assets, (see,
Cass [5], Pietra [24, 25], and Suda, Tallon and Villanacci [30]), here we have an
additional di¢ culty, related to the monetary eqs. The most convenient approach
is to drop the last  eqs. of Gn0nd(; ; E); eliminating the variable E: We will still
use E just to describe the sets of economies which depend upon the selection of a
specic value of the exchange rates. From now on we call Gn0nd(; ) the set of global
monetary equations epHh !
s
h   eMsA  MsB = 0: Fix  and dene the system of
equations
(; ) 
"
nL(; )
G
n0
nd(; )
#
= 0;
where nL(:) is the system of market clearing equations for each commodity and
asset, but commodity L; for each : Evidently, nL(; ) = 0 implies market
clearing for all the commodities and all the assets. (; ) is given by (L+ I   1)
equations in (L + I +  1) endogenous variables. Given ; a ME is a solution to
(; ) = 0 and is regular if and only if D(p;q)(; ; ) has full rank, where
D(p;q)(; ) =

D(p;q)
nL(; )
	n0(
P
h !h; e) 0
  ;
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and where 	n0(
P
h !h; e) is the ( L) matrix with generic non-zero coe¢ cients
eks
P
h !
s
h: The standard approach must be adjusted to take care of this addi-
tional set of  equations. Here, and in the sequel, we start with an arbitrary
economy (u; !) and one of its nonsunspot equilibria associated with some e 2 E ,
 = (p; q; e) : We perturb utility functions and endowments, constructing an econ-
omy e  (e!; eu) such that  is still an equilibrium of e and with a very simple
structure of the matrix D(p;q)(;e) at , so that we can easily establish that its
rank is full. Given eu (which can be taken arbitrarily close to u); we then con-
struct b! arbitrarily close to ! and such that  is an equilibrium for each economy
(eu; !) ; ! = b! + (1  ) e! for some  2 [0; 1] : The structure of the matrix
D
(p;q)
(; eu; !) shows that, at ; detD
(p;q)
(; eu; !) is a nontrivial polynomial
in : Hence, at ; detD
(p;q)
(; eu; !) = 0 has a nite number of solutions, and
detD
(p;q)
(p; q; eu; !) 6= 0 for  in some generic subset of [0; 1]. This immedi-
ately implies that the subset of economies with a regular nonsunspot equilibrium
is dense. Its openness follows immediately. The details are in Appendix. Here, we
use perturbations of the utility functions,  
Y
h
(U  RL(S+1)++ ) and a subset of 
is generic if it is open and dense.
Lemma 2. Assume A1 and A2; x E 2 E ; and consider the economy with
G
n0
nd(:) = 0: Then, there is an open, dense subset 
 
E
   such that, for each
(!; u) 2   E ; all the nonsunspot equilibria associated with E are regular in the
sunspot economy.
Given this result, existence and real indeterminacy of sunspot ME follow im-
mediately.
Theorem 3. Assume H > I; S > 2I; A1 and A2; and consider the economy
with Gn0nd(:) = 0: Then, there is an open, dense set of economies b  E   such
that the set of equilibrium allocations has  degrees of real indeterminacy in the
sunspot economy. Moreover, for each regular nonsunspot equilibrium associated
with E; there is an open nbd V (E) such that, for each bE 2 V (E) with bEks 6= bEk0s;
for some k; k0; s; xks( bE) 6= xk0s( bE); i.e., sunspots matter.
4. EXCESS VOLATILITY OF EXCHANGE RATES AND WELFARE
In this section we study the welfare e¤ects of extrinsic uncertainty. As men-
tioned in the introduction, excess volatility of exchange rates and its welfare im-
plications have been discussed in the literature from both the empirical and the
theoretical viewpoint. In our set-up, the notion of excess volatility can be formal-
ized in at least three di¤erent ways. One could argue that, per se, real e¤ects of
extrinsic uncertainty mean excess volatility of the endogenous variables, because,
by very denition, it is uncertainty unrelated to the fundamentals. However, given
a nonsunspot equilibrium, there are sunspots equilibria with a lower value of the
variance of the exchange rates. Therefore, to identify sunspot equilibria with "ex-
cess volatility" presents some ambiguity. To avoid it, we consider a nonsunspot
equilibrium and dene excess volatility as a mean-preserving increase of the vari-
ance of the exchange rates. A somewhat stronger notion could be dened in terms
of mean-preserving spreads of the exchange rates prevailing in the nonsunspot econ-
omy. This would require us to consider increases in the variability of the exchange
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rates across extrinsic events, for each intrinsic event, keeping the expected value of
the exchange rate invariant for each s: Looking at the proof, it will become clear
that, modulo some di¤erences in the details, our result still holds in this case. The
only substantive di¤erence is that the maximum number of agents such that Thm.
4 holds decreases from H < [(L  1)S   2] to H < (L  3)S; because the two
eqs. var(e) = var and Exp(e) = Exp are replaced by 2S eqs., a pair of similar
restrictions for each intrinsic event s > 0 (see Corollary 1).
Therefore, the question we address in this section is: Pick a nonsunspot equi-
librium with vector of exchange rates e: Is there any general welfare implication of
an increase in the variance of e; var(e), which preserves its expected value, E(e)?
Dene the map

 
; ; V ; var; Exp
 
266666666666664
(; )P

u1(x

1 (:))
K   V 1
...P

uH(x

H(:))
K   V H
var (e)  var
Exp(e)  Exp
377777777777775

24 (; )
W
 
; ; V ; var; Exp

35 = 0:
Given a nonsunspot ME, for an appropriate choice of the vector V and of
 
var;Exp

;
we obtain a solution to  (:) = 0: The previous question can then be reformulated
as: In general, is there a solution to 

; ; bV ;dvar;Exp = 0 for some vector
(bV ;dvar) >>  V h; var? As well known (see, Cass and Citanna [6], Citanna, Kajii,
and Villanacci [8], and Elul [12,13]), a su¢ cient condition for a positive answer is
that D (:) has full rank (in our set-up, at the nonsunspot equilibrium). When
this condition is satised, given ; by the implicit function theorem, we can lo-
cally nd a solution to (; ; bV ;dvar; dExp) = 0; for each vector (bV ;dvar; dExp) in
some open neighborhood of
 
V ; var;Exp

: In particular, we can nd it for eachbV >> V ; dvar > var; and dExp = Exp; so that a mean-preserving increase in the
variance of future exchange rates leads to a Pareto improvement. Obviously, we also
have Pareto worsening mean-preserving increases in their variance (simply, choosebV << V ):
We focus on the comparison of sunspot vs. nonsunspot equilibria. Abstracting
from sunspots, one could wonder if variations in the structure of exchange rates
satisfying, for instance, some additional restrictions on their covariances with some
other relevant variables, could have well-dened welfare implications. Our conjec-
ture is that the answer is, in general, negative.
Our approach can be directly (and more simply) applied to economies without
sunspots. To introduce additional restrictions on the allowed changes in exchange
rates would just alter some of the details of the argument.
In this section we do not need to perturb (MA;MB) and r (satisfying A2).
Hence, we set  =
Y
h

U  RL(S+1)++

:
In Appendix, we formally establish the next Thm.
Theorem 4. Let 2  H  [(L  1)S   2] : Under the maintained assumptions,
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there is an open, dense subset e  E  ; such that, for each (u; !) 2 e  E ; there
is a nonsunspot equilibrium such that there are both Pareto improving and Pareto
worsening mean-preserving increases in the variance of the exchange rates.
Its result can be strengthened, considering mean preserving spreads of exchange
rates in the sunspot economy. This just requires a minor change in the proof.
Corollary 1. Let 2  H  (L   3)S: Under the maintained assumptions,
there is an open, dense subset e  E  ; such that, for each (u; !) 2 e  E ; given
a nonsunspot equilibrium, there are both Pareto improving and Pareto worsening
mean-preserving spreads of the exchange rates in the sunspot economy.
Remark 7. In the proof of Thm. 4, we x a particular vector e = E and the
result holds generically for one of the nonsunspot ME associated with E: One could
also strengthen the result, showing that it actually holds generically at each non-
sunspot ME associated with E: Moreover, if we are willing to restrict the analysis
to bounded and bounded away from zero subsets of the space E ; the same result
holds generically at each nonsunspot ME: Both arguments are straightforward, but
tedious, and therefore omitted.
Remark 8. A similar result holds when one considers economies with no ex-
trinsic uncertainty as long as 2  H  S   2; i.e., as long as the number of
"free variables", the S exchange rates, exceeds the number of additional equations
(H + 2).
Remark 9. Given a nonsunspot equilibrium e; the characteristics of the vector be
with var(be) > var(e); Exp(be) = Exp(e) and associated with a, say, Pareto superior
allocation bx are entirely dictated by our choice of dvar and (bV1; :::; bVH): Generally
speaking, at the Pareto superior allocation sunspots matter, because, in the sunspot
economy, the argument works for a number of agents larger than in the nonsunspot
economy, given that we have a larger number of "free parameters",  instead of S:
The details of the proof of the Thm. are a little cumbersome, but the basic idea
is quite simple and develops the approach put forth in Pietra [26]. Let
D
 
; ; V ; var; Exp
 
2666664
Dp
(; ) Dq(; ) De(; )
	n0 (
P
h !h; e) 0  diag
h
MsB
eks
i
DpW (; ) DqW (; ) DeW (; )
3777775 ;
where (:) is the system of excess demand functions for all the assets and for a
collection of (L      1) commodities, selected so that (:) = 0 implies market
clearing for all the assets and commodities.7
By direct computation, and using the sequence of budget constraints, it is easy
7 In the proof of Thm. 4, we drop di¤erent physical commodities in di¤erent states of nature.
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to check that
DW (:) =
26666666666664
    1 [ez1 ]     01 [y1]
h
:::; 1e [0; rsB ]y1; :::
i
...
...
...
...
...
    1 [ezH ]     0H [yH ]
h
:::; 1e [0; rsB ]yH ; :::
i
0         
h
:::; 2(e
 Exp(e))
 ; :::
i
0          :::; 1 ; :::
37777777777775
:
As in the previous section, we replace the actual economy, ; with an economy
(u; b!) having the same equilibrium prices, ; and allocation, but with an associated
matrix DW (:) having a very simple structure. We then show that, for (u; b!);
D (:) has full rank. This may require a sunspot-invariant perturbation of some
utility functions and endowments. An argument similar to the one used to establish
Lemma 2, shows that this implies that, given  and any open neighborhood V
 


;
we can always nd 0 2 V   such that detD  :; 0 6= 0: This is the key result.
The details are in Appendix.
Remark 10. Thm. 4 can also be exploited to show that, in economies with
real assets (and, possibly, a unique equilibrium), there still exist sunspot equilib-
ria which are Pareto superior to the nonsunspot equilibrium. The Thm. rests on
the real indeterminacy of ME because this property is crucial to guarantee that,
generically, sunspot equilibria exist. However, real indeterminacy of ME and wel-
fare consequences of excess volatility are two logically distinct issues. This is also
because sunspot equilibria may exist in GEI characterized by local determinacy of
equilibria, where, as we have seen, exchange rates are a purely nominal variable. In
economies where ME are locally unique, sunspot equilibria characterized by excess
volatility of exchange rates can still exist and the same results on their welfare
consequences can still hold. Pick an economy with two nominal assets. Given
a nonsunspot equilibrium associated with some (sunspot invariant) e; there are
sunspot equilibria associated with two sunspot-dependent vectors ea; eb such that
x (ea) Pareto dominates x (e) which, in turn, dominates x
 
eb

. Following, essen-
tially, the technique developed in Mas-Colell [20], if there are enough commodities,
there is an economy with real assets such that the three equilibrium allocations 
x (e) ; x (ea) ; x
 
eb

are equilibria of its sunspot extension.
5. ECONOMIES WITH GD(:) = 0
With the condition Gd(:) = 0; the vector e has to be endogenously determined
at the ME, and there is a critical subset of values of e inducing a collapse of rank of
R(e): Therefore, the system of excess demand functions is discontinuous over the
set of possible exchange rates: Hence, we need a di¤erent existence argument. In
our framework, the pseudo-equilibrium map includes the monetary eqs. Our proof
of existence is a minor modication of the one in Du¢ e and Shafer [11]. The only
di¤erence is in the argument used to show that the derivative of the projection map
from the pseudo-equilibrium manifold to the space of the economies is nonsingular.
Here we just report the existence result.8 Thm. 5 refers to economies without
8The complete proof is in Salto, Pietra [29].
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sunspots and utility functions are xed, so that   RHL(S+1)++ < R2S++:
Theorem 5. Under the maintained assumptions, in the economy associated
with Gd(:) = 0, there is an open, dense subset d  ; of full Lebesgue measure,
such that, for each  2 d, there is a ME, with rank R(e) = I: Moreover, at
each  2 d; ME are locally described by a nite collection of smooth functions,n
j () ;

j1 () ; :::; 
j
H ()
o
; for j = 1; :::; J .
The existence argument, given the condition Gd(:) = 0; requires a perturbation
of the asset structure. Hence, it may fail if we impose additional restrictions, such
as the existence of a risk-free asset denoted in each currency.9
For given (MA;MB), equilibria are locally unique for economies with Gd(:) = 0:
However, in a well-specied sense, the analysis of the previous sections for economies
withGnd(:) = 0 carries over to this class of economies, because, locally, the structure
of the equilibrium set is the same, in allocation space. Indeed, real indeterminacy
of ME for the economies with Gnd(:) = 0 translates into e¤ectiveness of monetary
policy for the ones with Gd(:) = 0: This intuitive relationship is made precise in
the following Proposition (the proof is straightforward and, hence, omitted).
Proposition 1. Given
 
MA;MB

; let  be a ME associated with Gd(:) = 0:
Then,  is also a ME associated with Gnd(:) = 0; given E = e. Moreover, if
(p( bE); q( bE)) is a ME associated with Gnd(:; bE) = 0; there is a vector (MA( bE);MB( bE))
such that (p( bE); q( bE); bE) is an equilibrium associated with Gd(MA( bE);MB( bE); p; e) =
0:
This fact is quite convenient, because it allows us to study the properties of ME
for one class of economies and to extend the results (modulo a reinterpretation) to
the other. Evidently, if we are considering a sunspot equilibrium of the economy
dened by Gnd(:) = 0; the vectors of money supply required to support it as an
equilibrium of the economy dened by Gd(:) = 0 will have to be sunspot-dependent.
Consequently, the discussion concerning the welfare e¤ects of excess volatility must
be reinterpreted in this set-up as e¤ects of randomness of monetary policy unrelated
to the "fundamentals" f(:::; (uh; !h) ; :::) ; r; g of the economy. Evidently, the results
of section 4 holds.
Corollary 2. Let 2  H  [(L  1)S   2] : Under the maintained assump-
tions, there is an open, dense subset e  ; such that, for each (u; !) 2 e; there
are nonsunspot equilibria such that there are both Pareto improving and Pareto
worsening mean-preserving increases in the variance of the exchange rates induced
by sunspot-dependent monetary policy vectors (MA;MB).
6. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
Several properties of equilibrium exchange rates can be discussed exploiting
fairly natural extensions of the GEI model with outside money and liquidity con-
straints proposed in Magill and Quinzii [17]. Depending upon the precise specica-
tion of the monetary equations, equilibria can be characterized by local uniqueness
9Existence of ME can be obtained modulo some arbitrarily small, appropriate adjustment of
the money supply vectors. Hence, for an open and dense set of economies, not necessarily of full
Lebesgue measure.
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or by local indeterminacy. Under the conditions su¢ cient to establish real in-
determinacy of ME, there are also sunspot equilibria. A subset of them can be
characterized as induced by excess volatility of the exchange rates. Excess volatil-
ity can induce both Pareto improvements and Pareto worsening of the equilibrium
allocation.
In the Magill and Quinzii [17] class of economies, outside money is injected
into the economy because agents must sell their initial endowments to a central
exchange and, afterward, buy back their consumption bundle. Real indeterminacy
holds if agents (actually, at least some subset of agents) may freely buy and sell
from both exchanges. While, in our framework, this is a polar case, it is interesting
for several reasons. One of them is that the results obtained (generically) in the
indeterminate case may still hold for some sets of economies characterized by local
determinacy induced by the specication of the monetary equations (i.e., by the
precise mechanism of trade between agents and central exchanges).
7. APPENDIX
7.1. Proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2
Proof of Lemma 1. The square matrix R(e) is constructed picking any col-
lection of I rows of R(e) with at most one row for each intrinsic event. Consider
the map
A (d; e)  R(e)T d = 0;
with e 2 BM  RI ; a ball of radius M; and d 2 SI 1; the unit sphere in RI : Given
r, A : SI 1  BM ! RI : If A t 0 at each (d; e) 2 A 1(0); by the transversality
theorem there is an open, dense subset BM  BM ; of full Lebesgue measure, such
that for each e 2 BM ; Ae t 0 at each d 2 A 1e (0): Given that Ae : SI 1 ! RI ; this
implies that A 1e (0) = ;: We now show that A t 0 at each (e; d) 2 A 1(0): First,
for each d 6= 0 such that R(e)T d = 0; there are at most min f(IA   1) ; (IB   1)g
zero coe¢ cients ds; because the submatrices RA (e) and RB are in general position.
Hence, there are at least (IA + 1) nonzero coe¢ cients ds: Evidently, D(d;e)A (d; e)
contains the (I  2 (I   1)) dimensional submatrix
D(dn;en)A (d; e)
=
24 24 h e1r1TA    eI 1r(I 1)TA ih
r1TB    r(I 1)TB
i 35 " h r1TA d1    r(I 1)TA dI 1 i
[   ; 0;    ]
# 35 ;
where we omit the columns referred to dI = 1  PI 1s=1 di2 and eI : By the gen-
eral position assumption, rank
h
r1TB    r(I 1)TB
i
= IB : The general position
assumption for RA(1) and the considerations above imply that the top right sub-
matrix has full rank IA: Hence, rankD(dn;en)A (d; e) = I:
Now consider an increasing sequence, fMvgv=1v=1 and the associated sequence
BMv ; where the balls are centered on 0. The measure of RS++nE is the measure
of the union of a countable collection of zero measure sets. Hence, it is a null
set. Denseness of E follows by applying the argument above to any nonempty,
open subsets of RS++nE . Openness of E is obvious because detR(e) is a continuous
function of e: 
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Proof of Thm. 2. Pick E such that rank R(E) = I and any  2 0(E); the
set of regular economies associated with E: Pick a regular equilibrium  associated
with e = E and
 
x; y; 

: A standard (hence omitted) argument shows that, given
e; there is a generic set of economies such that
rank [R(e)y1; :::; R(e)yH ] = I (A)
holds. The vector (MA;MB) is xed in the proof, and omitted as an argument of
the various functions. We just assume that, for some s; s0;
MsBr
1s
MsAr
(IA+1)s
6= M
s0
B r
1s0
Ms
0
A r
(IA+1)s0
(B)
In the sequel, given e = E, we restrict the analysis to the generic subset of economies
"
 
E
  0  E such that (A B) hold. Continuity of the equilibrium map implies
that they also hold for each e in some open nbd V(e):
Fix
 
r1; rIA+1

and let rn =

r2; :::; rIA ; rIA+2; :::rI

: In the sequel, we denote
d [s] the diagonal matrix with generic non-zero coe¢ cient s:
We start with an observation on the spanning of R(e) in terms of real purchasing
power. Given a regular equilibrium (; x; y) associated with e; assume that there isbe 6= e with associate equilibrium (b; x; by) : Then, for each s; the vectors ps and bps
must be collinear. Moreover, taking into consideration the monetary eqs., we must
have besMsA +MsB
esMsA +M
s
B

esps` = besbps`; for each s`:
Hence, under (A), invariance of the equilibrium allocation at e and be requires
< R(e) >=< d

esMsA +M
s
BbesMsA +MsB

R(be) >;
so that the span of the payo¤ matrix, in terms of real purchasing power, is the
same at the two equilibria. Thus, it must be that each column i of R(e) can be
expressed as a linear combination of the columns of d
h
esMsA+M
s
BbesMsA+MsB
i
R(be); with weights
(1i ; :::; 
I
i ): Without any loss of generality, consider the two columns (1; IA + 1) :
For some (1; IA+1) 2 R2I ; it must be
A(; be; e; rn) 
2664

er1
  d h esMsA+MsBbesMsA+MsB iR(be)1
rIA+1
  d h esMsA+MsBbesMsA+MsB iR(be)IA+1
3775 = 0:
A(e;rn)(; be) maps RS+2I into R2S . Given that S > 2I, by a standard application
of the transversality theorem, if A(; be; e; rn) t 0 at each solution A(; be; e; rn) =
0 such that be 6= e, then, for a generic choice of (e; rn); there is no solution to
A(e;rn)(; be) = 0 with be 6= e: By direct computation, at a solution to A(; be; e; rn) =
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0;
DeA(:) =
2664
d

r1s
  d h MsAbesMsA+MsB iR(be)1
 d
h
MsAbesMsA+MsB
i
R(be)IA+1
3775
=
2664
d

r1s
  d h MsAesMsA+MsB i d h esMsA+MsBbesMsA+MsB iR(be)1
 d
h
MsA
esMsA+M
s
B
i
d
h
esMsA+M
s
BbesMsA+MsB
i
R(be)IA+1
3775
=
26664
d

r1s
  d h esMsAr1sesMsA+MsB i
 d

MsAr
(IA+1)s
esMsA+M
s
B

37775 =
26664
d
h
MsBr
1s
esMsA+M
s
B
i
 d

MsAr
(IA+1)s
esMsA+M
s
B

37775 :
Hence,
rankD(e;rn)A(:)
= rank
26664
d
h
MsBr
1s
esMsA+M
s
B
i
 d
hbes esMsA+MsBbesMsA+MsB i21     d h esMsA+MsBbesMsA+MsB iI1
 d

MsAr
(IA+1)s
esMsA+M
s
B

 d
hbes esMsA+MsBbesMsA+MsB i2IA+1     d h esMsA+MsBbesMsA+MsB iIIA+1
37775
= rank
24 d  MsBr1sMsAr(IA+1)s

 IS21     ISI1
 IS  IS2IA+1     ISIIA+1
35 ;
where IS is the SS identity matrix. Dene the last matrix as A(:). If rankA(:) <
2S; it must be [1] = 

IA+1

for some  6= 0, and MsBr1s
MsAr
(IA+1)s
=   for each
s: This is impossible, because, by construction, (B) above holds, so that, for some
s; s0; M
s
Br
1s
MsAr
(IA+1)s
6= Ms
0
B r
1s0
Ms
0
A r
(IA+1)s0
. Hence, rankA(:) = 2S and, given (r1; rIA+1); there
is an open, dense set (e; rn) of full Lebesgue measure such that A(e;rn)(; be) t 0 at
each solution A(e;rn)(; be) = 0 with be 6= e: Thus, A(e;rn)(; be) = 0 has no solutionbe 6= e; for each economy  in some generic set that we can identify with "(E)
itself. A standard argument completes the proof. 
7.2. Proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem. 3
Here, and in the sequel, we will use extensively the structure of the matrix
D(:) and it is convenient to report its most relevant properties (see Balasko and
Cass [3]).
Fact 1. Under the maintained assumptions, for each h,
Dzh(; ) =  

B1h B
2
h

DFOCh(:);
where B1h is a negative semi-denite matrix. Moreover, the submatrix obtained from
B1h by deleting the (+ 1) rows and columns indexed by `(), for each collection
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(`(0); :::; `()) is negative-denite. Hence, it has full rank (L + I      1): Also,
B1h B
2
h

does not depend directly upon zh and yh:
Throughout the proof, p0L = e0 = 1: As above, d

ks

denotes a diagonal
matrix, with typical nonzero coe¢ cient ks:
Consider the sunspot economy. By direct computation,
DFOCh(:) =
266666666666666666666666664
dp dq de
 d
h
ksh e
ks
i
0
266664
0    0
 11h

p11
T    0
...
. . .
...
       KSh

pKS
T
377775
0  0hII

 11h

r1A
T     KSh rSAT
0 0 0

 	(zh; e)
   [yh]
0
 266664
0    0
r1A 0

[yh]
T    ...
...
. . .
...
0    rSA 0 [yh]T
377775
377777777777777777777777775
;
where the rst row reports the variables we are di¤erentiating with respect to.
	(zh; e) has the same structure as 	(p; e) ; but for zks`h replacing p
ks`:
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider an economy (u; !) and any e such that rankR(e) =
I: Let  be any associated nonsunspot equilibrium. We need to show that, generi-
cally, D(p;q)(:) has full rank at ; in the sunspot economy. Bear in mind that all
the derivatives are computed at : By direct computation, and rearranging columns,
we can rewrite it as
D(p;q)(:) 
264 D(pnL;q)
nL(:) D(p1L;:::;pL)
nL(:)h
	n0(
P
h !
nL
h ; e) 0
i
d

eks
P
h !
sL
h

375 :
Given (u; !) ; consider a sunspot-invariant perturbation of !1; with e!sL1  (!sL1   ees )
and e!s`1  !s`1 ; for each s` 6= sL and s = 0: For each h > 1, e!h  !h: ex is also
identical to x; but for exsL1  (xsL1   ees ); for each s: Dene the following (locally)
quadratic perturbation of u1 (x1) :
eu1(x1)  u1(x1) +  (x1) (ax1   1
2
[x1]
T
Dx1);
whereD  D2xu1 (x1) jex1  D2xu1 (x1) jx1 is a symmetric, square, L(S+1) dimensional
matrix, while a  [rx1u1 (x1) jx1  rx1u1 (x1) jex1 +Dex1] is an L(S+1) dimensional
vector: It follows that
1. rx1eu1 (x1) jex1 = rx1u1 (x1) jx1 ;
2. D2xeu1 (x1) jex1 = D2xu1 (x1) jx1 :
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Hence, D21FOC1(:; eu1; e!1)j(ex1;) = D21FOC1(:;u1; !1)j(x1;): Moreover, for e
small enough, (eu; e!) satises A1: It is easy to check that, for each e small enough,
 is a nonsunspot ME of the economy (eu; e!), with associated allocation ex:
Fix any open nbd V (u; !) : For each e su¢ ciently small, (eu; e!) 2 V (u; !) : We
now show that there is an economy (!; eu) arbitrarily close to (eu; e!); hence to
(u; !), and such that detD(p;q)(:; eu; !) 6= 0:
Given e 6= 0; x u = eu and dene the economy with b!1 = ex1 and b!h = xh; for
each h > 1: Evidently,  and
 ex; 0;  is a nonsunspot ME of (eu; b!); with ezh = 0:
Moreover, at this equilibrium, D(p;q)FOCh(:; euh; b!h) does not depend, directly,
upon the endowments, and, therefore, upon the value of e, and
D(pnL;q)
nL(:) =  
X
h
B
1nL
h
2666664
. . .         
...  hI(L 1)
...
...
...
. . .
...
          0hII
3777775
is a full rank matrix, since it is the sum of negative-denite matrices. In the economy
(eu; b!); let bC    hD(pnL;q)nL(:)ji 1DpLnL (:; eu; b!) ; so that
h
D(pnL;q)
nL (:; eu; b!) DpLnL (:; eu; b!) i  bCI

= [0];
and dene the   matrix
bF  "h 	n0(b!nL; e) 0 i bC + d"eks HX
h
b!h## :
By construction of b!;
bF = " 	n0(!nL; e) 0  bC + d"eks HX
h
!h
##
  d
"
eks
e
es
#
 G  eI;
by sunspot invariance of e. Given that G does not depend upon e; we can arbitrarily
perturb e without a¤ecting it. Evidently, if det bF = 0; e is an eigenvalue of G: Given
that eigenvalues are locally unique, bF has full rank , modulo an arbitrarily small
perturbation e: Then, for an appropriate value of e; at the associated (eu; b!);
rankD(p;q)(:) = rankD(p;q)(:)

IL+I  1 bC
0 I

= rank
"
D(pnL;q)
nL (:; eu; b!) 0h
	n0(
Ps
h b!nL; e) 0 i bF
#
= L   1:
Thus, given any open nbd V (u; !) ; we can pick e and construct (eu; e!) 2 V (u; !)
and (eu; b!) so that
detD(p;q)(:; eu; b!) 6= 0:
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Given eu; consider the set of endowments !  (b! + (1  ) e!); with  2 [0; 1] :
First,  is an equilibrium for each ; with associated
 exh; yh ; h for each h; where
yh = (1  ) eyh: Secondly, the last  rows of the matrix D(p;q)(; eu; !) are
 invariant: Finally, the rst (L + I     1) rows are given by
D(pnL;q)
nL(; eu; !) =  X
h
B
1nL
h
2666664
. . .         
...  hI(L 1)
...
...
...    . . . ...
          0hII
3777775 
X
h
B
2nL
h Mh()
where Mh() is given by the last ( + 1) rows of DFOCh(:); after dropping the
columns referred to commodity L at each spot. It is clearly a linear function of :
Hence, detD(p;q)(; eu; !) is a polynomial in  and detD(p;q)(; eu; !) 6= 0 at
 = 1: Given that non-trivial polynomials have a nite set of zeros, we can always
nd  such that (eu; !) is arbitrarily close to (eu; e!); hence to (u; !), and such that
D(p;q)(:; eu; !) has full rank. This establishes the density part. Openness follows
immediately because detD(p;q)(:; eu; !) is a continuous function:
By Thm. 1, given E; for all the economies in some generic subset 0(E), for each
(u; !) 2 0(E); all nonsunspot equilibria are regular and there is a nite number
of them. By repeating the argument above for each equilibrium, and taking the
intersection of the nite collection of open, dense sets so obtained, we construct
a generic set (E) such that all the nonsunspot equilibria associated with E are
regular in the sunspot economy. 
Proof of Thm. 3. The spanning argument exploited to show the real in-
determinacy result in Thm. 1 basically works in the sunspot economy, too. Pick
a nonsunspot equilibrium associated with e 2 R++: Assume that the associated
equilibrium is regular in the sunspot economy and that it satises (A B) dened
in the proof of Thm. 2, and
IAX
i=1
rsiyih 6=s pszsh

esMsA
esMsA +M
s
B

; for each s and h: (C)
Pick any two vectors be 6= e, be; e2 V(e) with associated allocations bx and ex: Given
that there must be some k(s)s such that bek(s)s 6= ek(s)s; the pure spanning argument
above still applies, when restricted to the vectors

e11; e1s 1; ek(s)s; e1s+1; :::; e1S

.
Hence, it must be bx 6= ex: The real indeterminacy result follows immediately.
Moreover, consider any be such that, for some s and k; k0, beks 6= bek0s: If bzksh = bzk0sh ;
it must be that bpks and bpk0s are collinear and, taking into account the monetary
eqs., that
bek0sbpk0sbzksh = beksbpksbzksh bek0sMsA +MsBbeksMsA +MsB :
The budget constraints in the two states require
IAX
i=1
bek0srsibyih + IX
i=IA+1
rsibyih = bek0sbpk0sbzksh = beksbpksbzksh bek0sMsA +MsBbeksMsA +MsB
and
IAX
i=1
beksrsibyih + IX
i=IA+1
rsibyih = beksbpksbzksh :
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Hence,
IAX
i=1
bek0srsibyih   IAX
i=1
beksrsibyih = beksbpksbzksh
 bek0sMsA +MsBbeksMsA +MsB   1
!
IAX
i=1
rsibyih = bpksbzksh  beksMsAbeksMsA +MsB

:
By (C) above, at e this condition is violated at each s: Hence, it must also be
violated for each be su¢ ciently close to e; so that, locally, sunspots matter at eachbe such that, for some s; k; k0; beks 6= bek0s:
If one takes as a reference point, as we are doing, a regular nonsunspot equi-
librium, if be 6= e but, for each s, beks = ek0s for some permutation of the indexes
k; k0; we clearly obtain that bx = ex modulo a permutation of the allocation across
extrinsic events. It is far from obvious that one should consider the two equilibrium
allocations as di¤erent, from a substantive viewpoint. To avoid this issue, take as
starting point a regular sunspot equilibrium with eks 6= ek0s for each k; k0 and each
s: The same argument implies that, locally, given be 6= e; the associated bx; ex satisfybx 6= ex and it cannot be beks = ek0s for each k; k0 and each s: This rules out the
possibility that bxks = exk0s; for each s and modulo some permutation of the indexes
k: 
7.3. Proof of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1
Restrict the analysis to economies with a regular sunspot equilibrium, i.e., to
 2 (E). As motivated in the text, the proof reduces to show that, for each  in
some generic subset of (E); there is a regular sunspot equilibrium such that
rankD (:)  rank
24 D(:)DGn0nd(:)
DW (:)
35 = (L + I     1) +  + (H + 2):
We start with a fairly obvious result.
Fact 2. Without any loss of generality, the economy (u; !)   2 (E) has
a regular nonsunspot equilibrium ; with associated ; such that 
1
1

2
1
6= 
1
H

2
H
:
Proof of Fact 2. Given ; replace u1 (xh) with
u1 (xh) = u1 (x1) +  (x1)
X
s`
s
s
1e
sps`xs`1
for some vector  such that
h
:::; 
s
1(1 + 
s); :::
i
Y (e) = 0 and

1
1(1+
1)

2
1(1+
2)
6= 
1
H

2
H
:
Given that @u

1 (x1)
@xs`1
= @u1(xh)
@xs`1
+ s
s
1e
sps`; (x1; y1) ; with Lagrange multipliersh

s
1 (1 + 
s)
i
; is 1s optimal choice at : Given (x1;  (x1)) ; u

1 (x1) satises A1
above; for  su¢ ciently small. The claim follows immediately. 
We now replace the actual economy  with a new economy  (), with the
same equilibrium  and such that the associated matrix DW (:) has a very simple
structure.
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Given  2 (E);  ()  (u; ! ()) is dened as follows: For agent 1, !s`1 () 
xks`1 for all the commodities but (11; 1L; 21; 2L) ; !
s1
1 ()  xs11   ; and !sL1 () 
xsL1 +
ps1
psL
; for s = 1; 2:
Dene a one-to-one map f : f2; :::;H   1g ! f:::; (s1; :::; s (L  1)) ; :::g n f11; 21g ;
associating with each agent h; 1 < h < H 1; one commodity s`; ` 6= L and s` 6= 11;
s` 6= 21: For each agent h; 1 < h < H; !s`h ()  xks`h for all the commodities, but
commodity f(h), !f(h)h ()  xf(h)h  ; and, for the same s, !sLh ()  xsLh + p
f(h)
psL
:
Hence, agent h; 1 < h < H; buys one unit of good ` paying in terms of commodity
L at s such that s` = f(h): Set !H ()  xH +
P
h<H(x
sL
h   !h ()): For each ;
! () is sunspot-invariant and
P
h !h () 
P
h !h: Evidently,  is a ME of the
new economy  () ; associated with
 
xh; 0; h

; for each h.
For notational convenience, assume that K = (L  1) and H = (KS   2) (the
maximum number of agents allowed). For the same reason, and without any loss
of generality, assume that
 
eS   E(e) = 0: Consider the matrix D (:) ; where all
the derivatives are computed at :
Dene the collection of (L  1) columns
d 
8<:
 
dp111; dp212; :::; dpK1(L 1)

; :::;
 
dp1(S 1)1; :::; dp(K 1)(S 1)(L 1)

, 
dp1S1; :::; dp(K 1)S(L 1)

; deK(S 1); deKS
9=; :
Given any  2 (E) and associated  (), apply the following column operations
(we identify columns in the obvious way) to the matrix D (;  ()) :
a: For each ks; add to column dpksL the sum of the columns

dpks1; :::; dpks(L 1)
	
multiplied by the corresponding p
s`
psL
;
b: Subtract column dpksk from column dpk
0sk to eliminate all the (collinear)
columns dpk
0sk; k0 6= k;
c: Use columns deKS and deK(S 1) to get rid of all the non-zero coe¢ cients in
the last two rows.
Fact 3. For each  6= 0, DdW (;  ()) has full rank. Moreover, modulo a
rearrangement of the columns,
De (:;  ()) =  Dnd e(:;  ()) Dd e(:;  ())
[0] [DdW (:;  ())]

266664
24 Dnd;Le(:;  ())
Dnd;L eGn0nd(:;  ())
35 24 DLe(:;  ())
DL eGn0nd(:;  ())
35 24 Dd(:;  ())
DdG
n0
nd
(:;  ())
35
[0] [0] [DdW (:;  ())]
377775 ;
Proof of Fact 3. Given  6= 0; DW (:;  ()) (omitting the rst L columns, and
the ones in the collection fL + 1; :::; L + Ig ; which are identically zero) is given
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by2666666666666666664

1
1e
1
h
; 0; :::;  p11
p1L
i
   [:::; 0; :::] [:::; 0; :::]

1
2e
1
h
0; ; 0; :::;  p12
p1L
i
   [:::; 0; :::] ...
...
. . .
...
...
[:::; 0; :::]     SH 1eS
h
0; :::; 0; ; pSL 1
pSL
i ...

1
He
1

 ; :::; ; 
L 1P`
=1
p1`
p1L

   SHeS

 ; :::; ; 
L 1P`
=1
pS`
pSL

[:::; 0; :::]
[:::; 0; :::]      

:::;
2(es Exp)
 ; :::

[:::; 0; :::]       :::; 1 ; :::
3777777777777777775
;
where we use the index s to emphasize that all the variables are sunspot-invariant.
Each one of the rst L columns (but the one referred to good sL) has just
two non-zero coe¢ cients: the one of agent h such that s` = f(h) and the one
of agent H. By Fact 2, there is no loss of generality in assuming that [
1
1; 
2
1]
and [
1
H ; 
1
H ] are not collinear. Hence, the rst H rows are linearly independent.
The last two rows are clearly linearly independent of all the other rows. Hence,
rankDdW (:;  ()) = H+2; for each  6= 0: Due to the column operations (a  c) ;
all the other columns of DW (:;  ()) are identically zero. Hence, DW (:;  ())
has the structure displayed above. 
We now show that Dnd e(:;  ()) has full rank (L+ I 1):We proceed in two
steps. Fact 4 shows that, modulo a perturbation of u1; Dnd;Le(:;  ()) has full
rank. Then, Fact 5 will show that, generically, Dnd e(:;  ()) has full rank, too.
Let (:;  ()) be obtained deleting the market clearing eqs. for all the com-
modities included in the collection d and commodity L in states 0; K(S   1)
and KS: Evidently, (:;  ()) = 0 implies market clearing for all the assets and
commodities.
Fact 4. For each  6= 0 and close enough to 0, Dnd;Le(:;  ()) has full
rank, (L + I   1  ).
Proof of Fact 4.. To simplify, we compute the rank of Dnd;Le(:;  ()) at
 = 0: Once we have shown that this rank is full, continuity of detDnd;Le(:;  ())
in  will imply the stated property.
By Fact 1, Dz1 =  

B11 B
2
1

DFOC1. Bear in mind that, at  = 0;
the last ( + 1) rows of DFOC1 are identically zero, so that we can drop them
whenever convenient.
Given the structure of DFOC1; displayed above (before the proof of Lemma
2), the column operations described above a¤ect:
1. the rows referred to the commodities included in the collections d and L;
2. the last  columns of the rows referred to states K(S   1);KS:
Apply the column operations (a; b; c) described above to DFOC1: Drop the
rows and columns referred to the commodities included in d and to commodity L
in states 0; K(S   1) and KS: For each ks 6= K(S   1);KS; replace the column
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referred to commodity L with the one referred to the corresponding exchange rates,
obtaining the matrix
A1 

A1 (1) A2
 
01
 
=
266666666666664
 01I(L 1)    0    0 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...    Aks (1)   
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0    F ks (1)    A (1) 0
0    Dks (1)        01II
0             0
377777777777775
Evidently,
Dnd;Lez1(:) =  B11  A1 (1) A2  01  ;
where B1

1 is obtained dropping the rows and columns of the commodities in the
collection d; 0L; K(S   1)L, and KSL:
The square (L  1) dimensional matrix A1
 
1

is independent of !1; while it
is a linear function of 1: For ks 6= K(S   1);KS;
Aks (1) 
24  s1esI(L 2)  s1[pksn`();L]T
0  s1pksL
35 ;
where [pksn`();L] is the (L  2) dimensional vector obtained dropping pks`() and
pksL: Hence, Aks (1) has full rank (L  1). For ks = K(S   1);KS; Aks (1)  s1esI(L 1) : Dks(1) is a linear combination of the columns  ks1 [rsA]T : The
other o¤-diagonal nonzero components of A1 (1) are the matrices F ks (1) ; which
are non-trivial only for the rows associated with the commodities of states K(S 1)
and KS: The ones associated with KS are F ksKS (1) =

0I(L 1) 
s
1[p
n`()]T

:
The ones associated with K(S   1) are
F ksK(S 1) (1) =
h
0I(L 1)
es Exp
eS 1 Exp
ks
1

pksn`(ks)
T i
:
Each one of these matrices is a linear function of 1, independent of !1: All
the (L   1) dimensional square matrices on the diagonal have full rank. Hence,
given its block triangular structure structure,

A1 (1) A2 (1)

has full rank
(L + I     1) : As reported in Fact 1, B11 has full rank, so that the same holds
for

B1

1

A1 (1) A2 (1)

: Since
Dnd;Le(:) =   hB11  A1 (1) A2 (1) i+X
h>1
Dnd;Lezh(:);
rankDnd;Le(:) = rank hB11 h A1 101 A2 (1) ii 1Dnd;Le(:)
= rank
h
B1

1
h
A1

1
01

A2 (1)
ii 1 "X
h>1
Dnd;Lezh(:)
#
 01

I(L+I  1)

:
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If detDnd;Le(:) = 0; 01 is an eigenvalue of the matrix just described. The
perturbation of the utility function described above allows us to change arbi-
trarily 01; without a¤ecting the vector
1
01
: Given that, for every square matrix,
eigenvalues are locally unique, modulo an arbitrarily small perturbation of u1;
detDnd;Le(:) 6= 0: 
Fact 5. Modulo an arbitrarily small perturbation of  () ; D(nd;L;L)e(:)
has full rank.
Proof of Fact 5. We can exploit the same perturbation of (u1; !1) used in
the proof of Lemma 2 above to a¤ect the matrix DL eGn0nd(:), without a¤ecting the
equilibrium and the matrices Dnd;Lez1(:) and, hence, Dnd;Le(:):
The columns operations (a) described above turn the matrix DLGn0nd(:) into
DL eGn0nd(:) =
26664
. . .
...
...
... eks
P
h b!sLh ...
...
...
. . .
37775+
266664
. . .
...
...
...
L 1P`
=1
ps`
psL
...
...
...
. . .
377775
Given that Dnd;Le(:) has full rank, the following matrix is well-dened24 Dnd;Le(:) DLe(:)
Dnd;L eGn0nd(:) DL eGn0nd(:) + I
35
264 IL+I  1  
h
Dnd;Le(:)i 1DLe(:)
0 I
375
=
2664
Dnd;Le(:) 0
Dnd;L eGn0nd(:)   Dnd;L eGn0nd(:) hDnd;Le(:)i 1DLe(:) +DL eGn0nd(:)
3775 :
The (sunspot-invariant) perturbation used in the proof of Lemma 2 allows us to
change DL eGn0nd(:) by a term I; without a¤ecting anything else. As already
discussed there, this implies that we can nd an arbitrarily small perturbation such
that, at the associated ; the matrix above has full rank : It follows that, for some
economy (eu; e!); arbitrarily close to (u; ! ()), De (:) has full rank. 
Proof of Theorem 4. By Fact 2, we can pick an economy  in the generic
set such that, at a regular nonsunspot equilibrium , 
1
1

2
1
6= 
1
H

2
H
: Pick any open
nbd V
 


: By Fact 3-5, we can construct an economy (eu; e!); arbitrarily close to
(u; ! ()), such that De (:) has full rank at its nonsunspot equilibrium .
Let e be the perturbation of agent 1s endowment and consumption dened in
Fact 5. Dene the economy (eu; !) where !sL1  (!sL1   ees ) and !s`1  !s`1 ; for
each s` 6= sL and s = 0: For each h > 1, !h  !h: x

is also identical to x; but
for xsL

1  (xsL1   ees ): For e su¢ ciently small, (eu; !) 2 V () and  is one of its
regular nonsunspot equilibria.
Let !  e! + (1   )! and consider the set of economies   (eu; !): Evi-
dently,  with associated x is a ME for each  2 [0; 1]. The vector (1; :::; H) is
also  invariant. On the other hand, the vector (y1 ; :::; yH) is a linear function of :
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It follows that detD(; 
) is a polynomial in : Given that detD(; 
1) 6= 0;
for an open and dense subset (of full Lebesgue measure) of [0; 1], detD(; 
) 6=
0: Hence, we can pick  such that  2 V () and detD(; ) 6= 0: This estab-
lishes density. Given that detD (:) is a continuous function, the openness part
of the Thm. follows immediately. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider a sunspot-invariant vector e and be such thatbeks = es+ "ks and, for each s, Exp("ksjs) = 0: Then, be is a mean-preserving spread
of e: To apply the argument of Thm. 4 to this set-up, we just need to replace, in the
denition of 
 
; ; V ; var; Exp

; the two eqs. var (e) = var; Exp(e) = Exp; with
the 2S eqs. var (ejs) = var and Exp(ejs) = Exp: It s easy to verify that the proof
works with some, mainly notational, adjustments, once we restrict the analysis to
economies with 2  H  S(L  3) agents. 
8. PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We consider economies without sunspots, so that L  (S+1)L: As well known,
in GEI models, the fundamental di¢ culty in the proof of the existence of equilibria
is due to the possible drop of rank of the payo¤ matrix when some variables (here,
exchange rates) hit some critical set of values. The canonical approach to deal with
this problem is in Du¢ e and Shafer [11]. Here, we just need to modify slightly
their argument to take care of the additional equilibrium conditions given by the
monetary equations Gn0d (:) = 0:
We start reformulating in a more convenient form the individual optimization
problems. Exploiting "Casstrick", agent 1s optimization problem can be recasted
as: Given (p; ; e) 2 P RL++  RS+1++  RS+1++ j0 = 1; e0 = 1	 ; a smooth mani-
fold of dimension (L + 2S); agent 1 solves optimization problem
choose x1 2 argmaxu1 (x1) subject to
X
s0
sespsxs1 = 1: (2)
It is well known that, under the maintained assumptions, the solution to (2) exists,
it is C1 at each (p; ; e) >> 0, and satises the boundary condition: for each
f(pv; v; ev)g1v=1 ; with (pv; v; ev) 2 P for each v and such that (pv; v; ev) !
(p; ; e) =2 P; the associated sequence fz1 (pv; v; ev)g1v=1 satises 1jjz1(pv;v;ev)jj !
0:
For h > 1, given (p; ; e) 2 P and a linear subspace  of dimension I in RS ;
replace hs optimization problem with
choose xh 2 argmaxuh (xh) subject to
X
s
sespszsh = 0 (3)
264 e
1p1z1h
...
eSpSzSh
375 2 :
As well known, under our assumptions, the optimal solution to (3) exists, is C1
at each (p; ; e) 2 P; and, if  = span [R(e)] ; it is also an optimal solution to (2).
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Following Du¢ e and Shafer [11], given
 
MA;MB

; a vector (p; ; e; ) with
associated allocation x is a pseudo-equilibrium if
i: x1 is an optimal solution to (2), and xh is an optimal solution to (3), for each
h > 1,
ii:
P
h (xh   !h) = 0;
iii: Gsd(MA;MB ; p; e) = 0; for each s > 0,
iv: span [R (e)]  .
In this denition, the monetary eqs. are satised only at s > 0: However,
modulo a normalization, pseudo-equilibria such that span [R (e)] =  are actual
ME, according to Denition 1 in the text, as established below.
Fact 6. Given
 
MA;MB

; let (p; ; e; ) with associated allocation x be a
pseudo-equilibrium with span [R (e)] = : Then, e with
i: ep0 = p0 and (eps; es) = (ps; es) for each s > 0;
ii: eqA = v []T RA(e) and eqB = M0Bp0PHh=HA+1 !0h []T RB ;
iii: e0 = M0B
p0
PH
h=HA+1
!0h
;
for v  M0A
p0
PHA
h=1 !h
; is a ME given Gd(:) = 0; for some

 PHh>1 yh; y2; :::; yH :
Proof. Given that the asset prices eq satisfy the noarbitrage conditions: eqB =
M0B []
TRB
p0
PH
h=HA+1
!0h
and e0eqA = M0B []TRA(e)p0PHh=HA+1 !0h ; it is straightforward to show that, for
h > 1, the budget constraints of (3) and (1) coincide in commodity allocation
space, given the prices dened above. For h = 1, at the given prices, the set of
feasible consumption bundle of problem (1) is contained in the one of problem
(2). By construction, (x1; y1) is a feasible solution to problem (1) at e, while
x1 is the optimal solution to problem (2) at (p; ; e). Hence, (x1; y1) must also
be the optimal solution to problem (1). Therefore, e is a ME.
Given Fact 6, we just need to show that pseudo-equilibria with rank R(e) = I
generically exist. Let  SI be the Grassmannian manifold of subspaces of RS of
dimension I:  SI is a C1; compact manifold without boundary of dimension
(S   I) I: Let P be the permutation matrix induced by the permutation  of
the indexes s = f1; :::; Sg and  be their set: If  2  SI ; there is  2  and
a (S   I)  I dimensional matrix A such that  =
n
w 2 RS j [IjA]Pw = 0
o
:
Moreover, given ; there is a unique matrixA with the stated properties. Finally,
let
W =

 2  SI j9 a (S   I) I matrix A such that  = w 2 RS j [IjA]Pw = 0		 ;
and '; ' : W ! R(S I)I ; be the map associating with each element in W
the matrix A such that  =
n
w 2 RS j [IjA]Pw = 0
o
: Then, fWg denes an
open cover of  SI ; ' is a homeomorphism of W onto R(S I)I ; and fW; 'g
is an atlas for  SI (these are Facts 1-3 in [11]). Dene as Z (p; ; e; ) the
system of aggregate excess demand functions, Z (p; ; e; )  z1(p; ; e; 1) +P
h>1 zh(p; ; e; !h; ): Evidently, Z (:) is C
1 at (p; ; e; ) with (p; ; e) >> 0;
and satises the analogous of the boundary conditions established above for
agent 1. Moreover, Z (p; ; e; ) = 0 only if
P
s 
sesps!s1 = 1. Also, dene
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K(; e; r; ) = [Ij'()]PR(e); with K : RS++RS++RSIW ! R(S I)I :
By Fact 7 in [11], K is a smooth map and rankDrK = (S   I)I: Dene the
pseudo-equilibrium map
F (p; ; e; r; ; !;M
n0
A ;M
n0
B ) =
24 Z (p; ; ; !)K(; e; r; )
G
n0
d (p; e; !;M
n0
A ;M
n0
B )
35 ;
and the set
 
n
(p; ; e; r; ; !;M
n0
A ;M
n0
B )jF (:) = 0; for  such that  =

y 2 RS j [IjA]Py = 0
	o
:
Fact 7. Under the maintained assumptions, for each ;
a: 0 is a regular value of F;
b:  is a submanifold of RL++  RS++  RS++  RSI W  RHL

++  R2S++
without boundary of dimension HL + SI + 2S,
c: the projection maps Pr : ! RHL++  R2S++  RSI is proper.
Proof of Fact 7. All the properties can be established as in Fact 10 in
[11], once we observe that the matrix
D
!1;r;M
n0
A ;M
n0
B
F (:) =
2664
D!1Z 0 0 0
0 DrK 0 0
 	n0 (p) 0  diag(e)  I
 	n0 (p) 0  I 0
3775
has full rank. Given that rankDrK = (S I)I; the top left matrix has full rank.
The bottom right submatrix has full rank, too: Hence, D
!1;r;M
n0
A ;M
n0
B
F (:) has
full rank.
Proof of Theorem 5. By Fact 7, Pr :  ! RHL++  R2S++  RSI is a
proper map between two manifolds, without boundaries, of the same dimension.
RHL
+2S
++  RSI is connected. Hence, applying mod 2 degree theory, if there is
a regular value  2  of Pr(:) such that the pseudo-equilibrium is unique, then
there is a pseudo-equilibrium for each  2 : Pick any ! 2 RHL++ such that !
is a Pareto optimal allocation, any e 6= [1] ; any collection r =  r1; :::; rI such
that r1 = rIA+1 = [1] ; rank R(e) = I; and such that the last I rows of R(e)
have full rank (all of this can be done under A2). We will choose
 
MA;MB

appropriately later on.
Pareto optimality obviously implies that, for each

M
n0
A ;M
n0
B

; there is a
unique equilibrium allocation. Agent 1's rst order conditions x the relative
prices p
s
ps1
: Fix  = [1] and normalize prices so that
P
s 
sesps!s1 = 1: Finally,
choose
 
MA;MB

so that the monetary eqs. are satised at each s > 0: Given
that rank R(e) = I; there is a unique solution to [IjA]R(e) = 0: Then, it
is immediate to verify that, given (!; (M
n0
A ;M
n0
B ); r), there is a unique ME
(p; ; e; ):
We still need to show that this pseudo-equilibrium is regular. Given  = id;
let G
an0
d (p; e) and G
bn0
d (p) be given by the rst and last S rows of G
n0
d (p; e)
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and consider
D(p;A;;e)F (:) =
2664
DpZ 0 DeZ DZ
0 DAKid DeKid 0
	n0(
PH
h=1 !h; e) 0 DeG
an0
d 0
	n0(
PH
h=HA+1
!h; e) 0 0 0
3775 ;
where 	n0(
PH
h=1 !h; e) has the same structure as 	
n0(p; e); but for ps` replaced
by
PH
h=1 !
s`
h . Similarly for 	
n0(
PH
h=HA+1
!h; e):
Notice that DAZ = 0 because, given that, for each h, zh is also the optimal
solution to problem (2), zh is the optimal solution to (3) for each : By the
same argument, (; e) is relevant just because it enters the aggregate budget
constraints
P
s0 
sespsxs1 = 1 and
P
s0 
sespszsh = 0: Given that just the
product (..., ses; :::) matters, it must be DZ = DeZ: Finally, DAKid has
rank (S   I)I, as shown in [11]; too:
Assume that D(p;A;;e)F (:) is singular. Then, there is a nonzero vector
(vp; vA; va; vb) such that v
TD(p;A;;e)F (:) = 0: Given that DAKid has full row
rank, it must be vA = 0: Given that DZ = DeZ; vpDZ = 0 implies vpDeZ =
0: Given that DeG
an0
d is a diagonal matrix of full rank (and vpDeZ+vADeKid =
0), va = 0: Hence, D(p;;e;A)F (:) has full rank if and only if the submatrix
N 

DpZ DZ
	n0(
PH
h=HA+1
!h; e) 0

does. By a standard result, if

B11 B
2
1

denes the rst L rows ofD(x1;1)FOC1;
D(p;)z1 =  

B11 B
2
1

26666664
 1IL    0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0     1SeSIL
 0x011     SeSxSL1
0    0
 1e1

p1
T    0
...
. . .
...
0     1eS

pS
T
 e1p1x11     eSpSxS1
37777775 ;
where IL is the L-dimensional identity matrix. For each h > 1, we can rewrite
(3) as
maxuh (xh) subject to
X
s
sespszsh = 0; [IS I j'()] [:::; espszsh; :::]T = 0;
so that, given that zh = 0; for each h > 1;
Dp
X
h>1
zh =  
X
h>1

B1h B
2
h
 24  diag(:::; IL rxshuh(xh))diag(:::; IL  h 1ps iT ; :::)
  [IS I j'()] [:::; 0; :::]T
35 ;
Similarly,
D
X
h>1
zh =  
X
h>1

B1h B
2
h

2666664
 1he1[p1]T
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...  SheS [pS ]T
0    0
3777775 :
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Pareto eciency of x implies that the gradients of the utility functions are
collinear. It follows that
[DpZ DZ]
266666666664
2666666664
[0]
T
0    0
0
h
p11
1
iT
   0
...
...
. . .
...
0      
h
pSL
S
iT
3777777775
 IS
377777777775
 [DpZ DZ]

C
 IS

= [0] :
Then,
rankN = rankN

IL C
0  IS

= rank
2666664
DpZ 0
	n0
PH
h=HA+1
!h; e
 26664
. . .    0
...
 espsPHh=HA+1 !sh
s
...
0    . . .
37775
3777775
= L + S;
because (see Thm. 1 in [11]) DpZ has full rank, and the bottom right submatrix
has rank S. Hence,  is a regular value of Pr(:); so that, for each  2 ; there
is a pseudo-equilibrium.
A standard argument (see Thm. 2 in [11]) shows that, therefore, there is
an open, dense subset d  ; such that, for each  2 d; there is a nite
collection of pseudo-equilibria such that rankR(e) = I; locally described by
smooth functions. In view of Fact 6, modulo a normalization, these are actually
ME.
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